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Abstract: 2006 generally represented a solid year in terms of macroeconomic
performance and labour market indicators, even under the threat of increasing
inflation and interest rates. However, some favourable aggregate labour market
indicators disguised major disparities at disaggregated regional, sectoral or
demographic levels. The major development in the labour market was the
implementation and operation of the WorkChoices legislation which will shape the
industrial relations landscape in Australia for many years to come. This article
presents an analysis of the performance of the macroeconomy and labour market, and
reviews the developments of the WorkChoices legislation.
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Introduction
In a year dominated by inflationary (and associated interest rate) pressures from rising
petrol prices and the continuing drought in Australia, labour market indicators
generally remained healthy and robust with historically low unemployment rates and
high labour force participation rates (LFPR). Total employment rose by 3 per cent
over the year and the unemployment rate fell to a low of 4.6 per cent. High levels of
labour demand have been driven by steady economic growth. However, the disparities
in the sectoral and geographic distribution of economic growth in Australia, due in
part to the strength of the minerals boom, have resulted in significantly different
labour market outcomes across Australia.
The most dramatic development in the Australian labour market, which will be felt for
years to come, was the implementation and operation of the WorkChoices industrial
relations legislation. A number of issues regarding this legislation warrant
investigation and analysis. Initially, a number of inequitable outcomes for workers
dominated the media coverage of this legislation. Other important developments
included the first wage decision of the Australian Fair Pay Commission, the High
Court challenge of the WorkChoices amendments and further legislative amendments
to WorkChoices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First the global and domestic
macroeconomic context is explored. This is followed by an analysis of labour market
indicators. Particular attention is given to the disparities emerging beneath seemingly
robust aggregate indicators. Finally, we present a review of the implementation and
operation of the WorkChoices legislation in Australia, followed by some concluding
remarks.
The Economic Context
After the 2001 recession, the world economy started moving into an expansionary
phase led by the United States, China and other East Asian countries but, by
comparison, meager growth rates have been experienced in Japan and Europe. In
general, global economic growth remained robust in 2006, with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting growth in the world economy in its September
World Economic Outlook at 5.1 per cent in 2006 and 4.9 per cent in 2007 (IMF
2006). Similar to Australia, in the US economy inflation has edged up because of
capacity constraints and rising energy prices. Due to past interest rate increases and a
weaker housing market, economic growth was at a slower pace towards the end of
2006 in both the US and Australia.
On the other hand, the IMF is still expecting double-digit growth rates in China for at
least the next two years. China’s expansion will positively impact on the rest of the
world including Australia, but the picture for Japan is not very promising as their
ongoing recovery is quite weak. Economic growth in Germany, France and the United
Kingdom was promising in the first half of 2006 as a result of improved business
confidence, stronger corporate balance sheets, and rising employment. However due
to some dampening effects on consumer spending from the increase in the value
added tax in Germany and the impacts of rising interest rates, economic growth is
expected to be sluggish in 2007. There has been a significant world-wide surge in
inflationary pressures driven by energy and other commodity price rises while
economies, including Australia, reach capacity constraints. This has forced many
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central banks to pursue tighter monetary policies. The contractionary monetary and
fiscal policies in Australia, coupled with the lack of spending on infrastructure,
capacity constraints, and skill shortages may hamper future economic growth.
On the back of strong Chinese demand and rising prices of coal and iron ore fuelled
with the mild depreciation of the currency (proxied with the real exchange rate-real
trade weighted), Australia received a substantial boost in 2006. The bulk of the
commodity boom accrued to the mineral-rich states of Western Australia and
Queensland. This recent boom in commodity prices could not come at a better time,
helping to compensate for the fall in the growth of private investment from 10 per
cent in 2005 to 2.9 per cent in 2006. Without higher commodity prices, the Australian
economy could have tipped into sharp downturn because of a downfall in the housing
market. According to Table 1, Australia’s terms of trade (the ratio of export prices to
import prices) rose by 6.8 per cent in 2006, taking the index to the highest level
experienced since the early 1970s. An increase in the terms of trade can exert a
multiplier effect on real income throughout the economy. During the last two years on
average this boost has been 1.5 percentage points of GDP (Macfarlane 2005). The rise
in income accrues to wage earners in the resource sector, some to domestic
shareholders and a large amount through increased taxation and royalties to
governments.
Comparing September quarter figures in 2006 and 2005, GDP grew at 2.2 per cent in
2006, about 0.7 per cent less than that of previous year, and well below trend growth
of over 3 per cent. Similarly, the total number of hours worked also increased at 1.9
per cent in 2006 but its growth rate was less than that of the previous year. At the
same time inflation stood at 3.9 per cent, reaching or breaching the upper end of the
Reserve Bank’s target range, despite several rate rises during the last year. Higher
petrol prices and a sudden rise in fruit prices brought about by cyclone Larry triggered
a bout of inflationary pressure in the economy. Table 1 shows that both inflation and
the nominal unit labour cost increased equi-proportionally in 2006, supporting the
view that labour market tightness contributed to a pick-up in wage inflation
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2006).
However, the nominal rise in the unit labour cost in 2006 (3.9 per cent) was less than
half of the one in 2005 (8.7 per cent).
Inflation has been on the rise since 2003 and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
has been quite pre-emptive in its fight against inflationary pressures. Due to the
impact of higher upstream price pressures and rising inflation, the RBA increased the
official cash rate three times in 2006 (3 May, 2 August and 8 November) each time by
25 basis points. The cash rate rose from 5.5 per cent in 2005 to 6.25 in 2006, resulting
in a 1.1 per cent rise in the average mortgage rate. According to the OECD “the
impact of high energy and exceptional fruit prices will fade away only gradually,
headline inflation may not fall back within the 2-3 per cent target range until mid2007” (OECD 2006, p.118). As a result of a higher housing interest rate (8 per cent)
and its adverse impact on housing affordability, real private investment (mainly
residential construction) grew by only 2.9 per cent in 2006 compared to a 10 per cent
growth in 2005. Undoubtedly the flattening of already high house prices and several
interest rate rises slowed down the housing sector significantly.
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As seen from Table 1, compared to 2005, the government increased its real current
expenditure (5.3 per cent) more than its real investment expenditure (4.6 per cent) in
2006, inducing partly more inflationary pressure on the economy. The annual growth
rates of government current expenditure and investment in 2005 were 2.7 per cent and
5.2 per cent, respectively. In 2006 real imports grew substantially and as strong as last
year (7.3 per cent) but real exports registered 6 per cent growth which was three times
more than that of 2005 (1.9 per cent), thanks to red-hot global demand for rising price
of raw materials, which constitute 60 per cent of Australia’s total exports.
Despite this positive change in the Australian economy, non-residents continued to
receive a substantial net income (such as interest payments on Australia’s foreign debt
and dividend payments to foreign owners of its mining companies) which constituted
73 per cent of Australia’s current account deficit. Australia’s net income balance has
been in deficit and volatile for more than twenty years now. According to Table 1, the
government fiscal surplus in 2006 was 1.5 per cent of GDP or equivalent to $14.8
billion ($4 billion more than the previous year). As usual, the bulk of the trade deficit
was financed through private borrowings mainly by Australian banks and financial
institutions. It should be borne in mind that an ongoing drought also exacerbated the
trade deficit. The Australian government has also managed to eliminate its debt
through running large budget surpluses and asset sales. Some analysts have argued
that given the large budget surplus, the inflationary effects of the government’s tax
cuts introduced in July 2006 were trivial (Business Monitor Online 2006).
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Table 1 Key Economic Indicators in 2005 and 2006
Variable

Unit

2005

2006

Real GDP growth

% change

2.9

2.2

Hours worked

% change

3.1

1.9

Terms of trade

% change

12.4

6.8

CPI

% change

3.0

3.9

Nominal Unit labour cost

% change

8.7

3.9

Real government expenditure

% change

2.8

5.3

Real household consumption

% change

2.7

2.8

Real Private investment

% change

10.0

2.9

Real Government investment

% change

5.2

4.6

Real exports

% change

1.9

6.0

Real imports

% change

7.6

7.3

Imports

$ Billions

190.2

210.9

Income received by non-residents

$ Billions

58.0

68.0

Exports of goods and services

$ Billions

167.6

196.3

Income paid by non-residents

$ Billions

25.3

29.0

Current account balance

$ Billions

-55.3

-53.5

Unemployment rate

%

5.1

4.6

Participation rate

%

64.4

64.8

Fiscal balance

$ Billions

10.8

14.8

Fiscal balance

% of GDP

1.2

1.5

Real exchange rate-Real Trade Weighted Index

% change

3.2

-1.1

Cash rate at the end of year

%

5.5

6.25

Housing interest rate

%

7.1

8.0

Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006a, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e); (b) Commonwealth Treasury
(2006); (c) the Reserve Bank of Australia (2006).
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Labour Force Developments 2006
The Australian labour market continued to exhibit strong growth during 2006 with
total employment rising by 3 per cent and the unemployment rate falling to an
historically low 4.6 per cent. High levels of labour demand have been driven by
steady, although not historically high, economic growth. However, the disparities in
the sectoral and geographic distribution of economic growth in Australia, due in part
to the strength of the minerals boom, have resulted in significantly different labour
market outcomes across Australia. This section provides an overview of the
Australian labour market in 2006 with particular emphasis given to the emerging
disparities that are concealed by the summary indicators of employment growth and
the unemployment rate.
Since the recession of the early 1990’s the rate of employment growth has been both
relatively stable, and relatively strong, by historical standards. This more stable
pattern of employment growth continued in 2006 with employment rising by 3.0 per
cent.
Strong employment growth since the early 1990s has, however, coincided with a
marked decline in the proportion of jobs that are full time. Part time work has grown
much more rapidly than full time work for both men and women. In 2006 the strong
growth of men in part time work continued with 9.6 per cent growth over the calendar
year. Growth of full time jobs held by women (5.5 per cent) continued to outstrip
growth in full time jobs held by men (2.0 per cent) over the same period. The number
of women in part time work in 2006 declined slightly, with the number of women
employed part time declining by 0.14 per cent.
Strong employment growth combined with low unemployment rates have also
resulted in record high labour force participation rates. Having begun 2006 at 64.4 per
cent the LFPR rose to 64.9 per cent by December after reaching a record 65.0 per cent
in August and September 2006. The steady growth in the LFPR over the past two
decades conceals the rapid rise in female participation and the steady decline in male
participation. Over the course of 2006, however, male labour force participation rose
slightly from 71.9 per cent to 72.3 per cent. This was the first annual rise in the male
LFPR since 1989. The female LFPR rose from 57.1 per cent in January 2006 to 57.8
per cent by December.
Despite the growth in the number of people entering the labour force, the strong
growth in employment has resulted in a historically low unemployment rate of 4.6 per
cent in December 2006. Over the course of 2006 the male unemployment rate fell
faster than the female unemployment rate. In December 1995 the unemployment rate
for both men and women was 5.2 per cent but by December 2006 the male rate had
declined to 4.4 per cent while the female unemployment fell only 0.2 per cent to 5.0
per cent.
While unemployment is low by historical standards there are substantial differences in
the unemployment rate across demographic and geographic groups. For example,
youth unemployment, that is the unemployment rate among those aged 15-19,
remains significantly higher than the unemployment rate in the broader community. In
December 2006 the unemployment rate for those in this age group was 14.3 per cent,
down from 15.6 per cent in December 2005. Despite this reduction the youth
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unemployment rate is still three times higher than the unemployment rate for the
entire labour force (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007).
The likelihood of being unemployed also varies significantly across geographic
regions. Table 2 shows the disparities that exist between the small geographic areas
with the highest unemployment rate and those with the lowest, with some areas
reporting zero unemployment while other regions are experiencing unemployment
rates of over 25 per cent. While regions such as Tanami and Sandover are quite
remote, it is important to note that the centre of the capital city of Hobart, the tourism
centre of Cairns, and the region of Playford on the outskirts of Adelaide are all
experiencing unemployment rate of over 15 per cent (Dept workplace etc).
While some suggest that excessive labour market regulation is a cause of
unemployment, it should be noted that within each state there are substantial
disparities in unemployment despite the existence of uniform regulatory structures.
Clearly the high unemployment rates experienced in regions such as Tanami and
Hobart are caused by demographic and sectoral factors rather than ‘rigidities’ in the
local labour market.
The disparities between regions shown in Table 2 are also apparent in the interstate
comparison of employment growth. Queensland (5.48 per cent) and the ACT (4.95
per cent) saw the most rapid rate of job creation in 2006 while Tasmania was the only
state to see employment decline. Despite the resources boom in Western Australia
employment growth in that state was the second lowest in Australia at only 1.84 per
cent. That said, in December 2006 the unemployment rate in Western Australia is
among the lowest in Australia (3.1 per cent) while the unemployment rate in
Tasmania was the highest in Australia at 6.1 per cent. The lowest unemployment rate
was recorded by the Northern Territory at 2.4 per cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2006a).
The uneven sectoral impacts of the mining boom on the Australian economy have
resulted in substantial disparities in the distribution of wage growth in 2006. Wages
have grown more rapidly in Queensland (4.5 per cent) and Western Australia (4.3 per
cent) than the national average of 3.8 per cent while employees in Victoria and South
Australia received average increases of just 3.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively.
Similarly, employees in the mining and construction industries experienced much
stronger wages growth in 2006 than those employed in the services sector (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 2006b).
The Implementation and Operation of WorkChoices Legislation
The WorkChoices revolution dominated events in the Australian labour market in
2006. Conceived in the aftermath of the Howard Government’s sweeping 2004
election victory, the Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (Cth)
No. 153 passed on 7 December 2005 but much of the Act did not take effect until 27th
March 2006. The legislation goes beyond the ambitions of earlier reform proposals
and, although it contains some continuity with the previous system, breaks from it in
very substantial ways. Draped in the language of fairness, the legislation is also firmly
underpinned by the neo-liberal notion that the price of labour must be set at level
which allows its supply to clear. Yet, as Briggs and Buchanan (2005) convincingly
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argue, WorkChoices blends ‘deregulatory rhetoric’ with a heavily interventionist
approach that seeks to unduly control agreement making processes and outcomesi.
The nuances of the introduced changes, their complexity and the associated
compliance burden, have been well documented in extensive academic commentary
(see for instance Cooney 2006; Chapman 2006; Ellem, Baird, Cooper & Lansbury
2005; Fenwick 2006; Forsyth & Sutherland, 2006; Hall, 2006; Stewart, 2006; Waring,
De Ruyter & Burgess 2006). Waring and Bray (2006) have summarised the
substantial consequences of the legislation in terms of six key themes. These include
the reduction of minimum standards and rights; the privileging of individual
contracts; the disempowering of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission; the
improvement of managerial prerogative and the weakening of unions; and, the
increasing power of the state in employment relations.

Table 2 Unemployment Rates in Selected Regions (September 2006)
Statistical Local Areas

Unemployment Rate September 2006

Tanami

25.4

Sandover

21.8

West Arnhem

19.7

Daly

18.2

Wacol

17.9

Playford (Elizabeth)

17.1

Hobart (Inner)

16.3

Cairns (City)

15.1

Bathurst (Melville)

14.9

Ballarat (South)

10.2

Auburn

10.1

Lake Grace

0.3

Victoria Plains

0.3

Unincorp (Lincoln)

0.0

Kowen

0.0

Weston Creek-Stromlo - SSD Bal

0.0

Source: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2006)
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Waring and Bray (2006) have suggested that the legislation results in the reduction of
minimum standards and rights through abolishing the ‘no disadvantage test’ and the
introduction of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard (AFPCS) – a
statutory standard composed of just five minimum conditions against which
agreements are tested. This arrangement represents a substantial reduction in
minimum standards since the benchmark for agreements has fallen substantially from
awards that (pre-reform) contained at least twenty matters to the five conditions of the
AFPCS. The abolishment of rights to access unfair dismissal remedies for employees
employed in businesses with 100 or fewer employees, is a further strong example of
the reduction of minimum standards and rights under WorkChoices.
The privileging of individual contracts is accomplished under WorkChoices. Under
the legislation, these statutory individual contracts prevail over all other industrial
instruments including collective agreements. Further, the legislation clarifies the
legality of offering employment contingent on the acceptance of an Australian
Workplace Agreement (AWA). As AWAs must only comply with the five conditions
of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, the legislation increases the
likelihood of employment on below-award conditions.
WorkChoices also removes the wage determination function from the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and places it in the hands of the newly
formed Australian Fair Pay Commission. The only remnant of wage determination
power left to the AIRC is the narrow role it retains to arbitrate conditions of
employment when the bargaining period has been terminated; and even then it must
do so with reference to decisions of the Australian Fair Pay Commission. These
changes along with the removal of access to remedies for unfair dismissal for a large
section of the workforce are indicative of the extent to which WorkChoices
disempowers the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.
Most analysis of the Act has also observed the way in which it substantially improves
managerial prerogative while further weakening the power of trade unions.
Management now have an almost unfettered power to hire using whatever industrial
instrument they choose, to unilaterally determine wages and conditions upon the
expiry of a certified agreement and to fire with few impediments. Meanwhile, union
activity is further circumscribed, inter alia, by tougher right of entry provisions and
complex secret balloting procedures before protected industrial action can be taken.
Waring and Bray (2006) also note the increasing power of the federal government in
industrial relations as a result of the extensive use of the corporations power to take
over much of the state’s industrial relations jurisdictions. Indeed McCallum (2006)
has suggested that the reforms represent the ‘corporatisation of industrial relations’ in
which labour law is increasingly supplanted by corporations law. As Stewart (2006)
has observed, in reality a single industrial relations system is not created by
WorkChoices since the constitutional mechanisms used by the federal coalition
government do not provide complete jurisdictional coverage. Nonetheless, the federal
government’s role in industrial relations is significantly magnified as a consequence
of the takeover of much of the state systems.
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Soon after the legislation came into effect, there were media reports of what appeared
to be legal, though inequitable, applications of the legislation. A number of these
cases occurred in low wage sectors of the economy consistent with some academic
predictions of where the more extreme possibilities of WorkChoices would be
explored. Some of these cases are discussed in a NSW Parliamentary Inquiry report
on the impact of WorkChoices published in November 2006. In particular, the NSW
Parliamentary Committee on Social Issues (2006) identifies the reported case of
employees at retailer Spotlight who had been offered AWAs which removed penalty
rates, overtime allowances and paid rest breaks in exchange for a 2 cent per hour
increase in pay. This, the report concludes, was estimated to have resulted in an
average $91 decrease in net pay per week. Similarly, in the hospitality industry, a
number of cases of alleged exploitation emerged as WorkChoices became law. The
Office of Workplace Services (OWS) ii for instance initiated proceedings against pulp
juice bar operator, POW Juice Pty Ltd, for alleged underpayment of twelve young
employees (OWS 2006). Indeed, restaurants and cafes’ ‘high rates of noncompliance’ in 2006 prompted the OWS to launch a targeted campaign in early 2007
involving random wages and conditions audits of the industry (OWS 2007).
Another case reported by Humphries (2006) in the Sydney Morning Herald shortly
after WorkChoices came into effect, brought to public attention the industrial relations
strategy of the owners of the Cowra Abattoir. The abattoir owners had chosen to
terminate 29 meatworkers and then rehire 20 on arrangements that amounted to a
$180 per week wage reduction. The employer had effectively relied on s.643 (8) of
the newly amended WorkChoices laws which protects businesses from an unfair
dismissal claim where an employee is terminated for 'operational reasons'. When the
case was publicised, the OWS investigated and claimed that it had persuaded the
company to withdraw the termination notices ‘despite evidence that Cowra Abattoir
had complied with the Act’. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) seized
upon these comments to demonstrate that Work Choices permits the unilateral
reduction of wages and conditions (ACTU 2006a, 2006b).
Aside from these more publicised cases, there were few other early empirical insights
into the operation of WorkChoices. An exception came in May in the form of
evidence provided to the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education
(EWRE) Committee by the Employment Advocate, Mr Peter McIlwain, on the
content of a sample of AWAs lodged between March 27, when WorkChoices took
effect, and April 30, 2006. The Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA) analysed
the contents of a small sample of 250 AWAs from a total number of 6263 lodged in
the first month of the WorkChoices operation. The Employment Advocate’s evidence
revealed that all AWAs expressly excluded at least one protected award condition
while 16 per cent excluded all protected award conditions (Senate EWRE 2006). The
evidence also revealed that 64 per cent excluded leave loading provisions, 63 per cent
excluded penalty rates and 52 per cent excluded shiftwork loadings (Senate EWRE
2006). According to McIlwain, 78 per cent of AWAs in the sample provided a pay
increase during the life of the agreement, meaning that 22 per cent did not.
A number of AWAs were also found to have substantially and illegally derogated
from the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. For instance, the Employment
Advocate informed the Senate Estimates Committee that 14 per cent of AWAs
provided casual employees with less than the mandatory 20 per cent loading. It is
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important to note that under WorkChoices, agreements including AWAs take effect
from the day of lodgement, hence the OEA has no power to prevent their registration
on the grounds that they provide less than the five minimum conditions of the
Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. In circumstances where the OEA
discovers illegal conditions, the agency refers these agreements to the OWS for
further investigation.
In November 2006, the Senate Estimates Committee on Employment, Workplace
Relations and Economics met again. The Employment Advocate again gave evidence
and informed the committee that a decision had been taken to discontinue the review
of the contents of a sample of AWAs that had taken place for the first five weeks of
WorkChoices operation (Senate EWRE 2006). As a result, it is not known how many
AWAs exclude protected award conditions or provide a wage increase during the term
of their operation. It is also unclear as to how many AWAs contain inferior and illegal
conditions. However, McIllwain (the Employment Advocate) indicated to the
committee that approximately 1700 AWAs, or a little below 1.5 per cent of all those
AWAs lodged with the OEA, had been referred to the Office of Workplace Services.
Upon further questioning from the members of the Senate Committee, it was revealed
that it is OEA practice to review only a sample of AWAs that are lodged (Senate
EWRE 2006). Hence it is from this sample that 1700 AWAs were found to contain
conditions that were likely below the minima provided by the AFPCS. Thus the 1700
referred AWAs represents a much larger though unknowniii percentage of the sample
of AWAs selected for review by the OEA. The actual number of AWAs that provide
questionable and most likely inferior conditions of employment is unknown but likely
to be much higher than the number referred to the OWS. This suggests that there are
significant numbers of AWAs that do not meet the minima of the AFPCS and which
are therefore illegal. However, unless these agreements are identified in the sample
reviewed by the OEA they are unlikely to receive further scrutiny.
One of the more keenly anticipated events during 2006 was the handing down of the
Australian Fair Pay Commission’s inaugural minimum wage decision. Under
WorkChoices, the Australian Fair Pay Commission now has responsibility for
reviewing the Federal Minimum Wage (FMW) from time to time and minimum
award wages (Australian Pay Classification Scales), the special FMW, piece rates,
periodic rates and casual loadings.
The Australian Fair Pay Commission’s decision surprised many when it was delivered
on 26 October, 2006. The AFPC announced an increase of $27.36 per week for award
wages up to $700 per week (including the FMW) and $22.04 for wages above $700
per week (AFPC 2006) citing a tight labour market and continuing economic
prosperity in support of the decision. As Waring, De Ruyter and Burgess (2006) had
argued, the altered legislative arrangements for wage determination and the fairly
opaque processes of the AFPC, suggested that it would not be predisposed to offering
generous minimum wage increases. However, its first pay determination was close to
the Australian Council of Trade Union’s call for an increase of $30 per week and, as a
consequence, drew a hostile reaction from some employer associations such as the
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry which described the decision as
‘excessive and disappointing’ (Hendy 2006). In contrast, Prime Minister John Howard
described the decision as ‘genius’ and ‘a very clever decision, a very fair decision’
(Howard 2006). The ACTU’s senior industrial officer, Belchamber (2006), has
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suggested that the increase was similar in nominal terms to previous award safety
rises granted by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and offers two
explanations for the decision; either that it was designed to quell criticism of the
Commission and opposition to the Howard Government’s industrial relations policies
more generally, or is an objective determination based on compelling evidence.
Another important, though far less heralded event, came with the release of the Award
Review Taskforce’s report on 3 November 2006 (Andrews 2006). The taskforce was
established in October 2005 and was required to report on the rationalisation of
federal awards and award wages and classification structures. The final report adopts
principles that will most likely result in the rationalisation of approximately 4000
federal awards (prior to March 2006) to between 100 to 150 awards. According to the
recommendation of the taskforce, awards will be rationalised on an industry basis
corresponding to the divisions of the Australian New Zealand Standard Classification
(ANZSIC) (Award Review Taskforce, 2006). Given the extent to which agreements
and awards are often inter-linked and ‘layered’ (see Bray and Waring 2005), the
consequences of such a large reorganisation may be far-reaching.
Finally, three other events in 2006 cannot go unnoticed in a review of the Australian
labour market. First, in a split 5:2 decision (Kirby J and Callinan J dissenting), the
High Court upheld the validity of the WorkChoices amendments. In essence the
majority confirmed the capacity of s.51xx (the Corporations power) to fully regulate
industrial relations. The decision validates the significantly extended reach of the new
federal industrial relations jurisdiction and will clearly have significant consequences
for industrial relations regulation whichever political party holds federal office in the
future.
Second, the amended Workplace Relations Act 1996 and the Workplace Regulations
2006 were further amended on 15 December 2006. The amendments reduce some of
the burdensome timekeeping requirements WorkChoices imposes; allows for the
cashing out of sick and carer’s leave so long as an employee retains a balance of 15
days; allows employers to stand down employees if they are idle due to factors
outside of the employer’s control; cap the accrual of annual leave and carer’s leave in
respect of worked hours above 38 and protect redundancy pay entitlements for a
period of 12 months after an agreement has been terminated (NSW Parliamentary
Committee on Social Issues 2006).
Third, the federal Independent Contractors Bill (2006) (Cth) and the Workplace
Relations Legislation Amendment (Independent Contractors) Bill 2006 were passed in
December but will not take effect until 2007. These related laws essentially override
the deeming provisions in state industrial relations laws and also state legislative
mechanisms for reviewing ‘unfair contracts’. Dr John Buchanan, in evidence given to
the NSW Parliamentary Committee inquiry on the impact of WorkChoices, argued
that the Independent Contractors Act’s consequences could be more significant than
WorkChoices in time because it creates the space which will permit independent
contractor arrangements to ‘flourish’ (NSW Parliamentary Committee on Social
Issues 2006).
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Taken together, these developments represent an unprecedented year of change in the
Australian labour market; the effects of which will be felt in years to come. ‘Mimetic
isomorphism’ or the pressure on employers to emulate others in response to similar
environmental conditions, will gradually permeate the labour market but especially in
low wage sectors where WorkChoices is likely to have a greater impact.
Conclusion
The Australian labour market experienced strong growth in 2006. The cumulative
effect of over a decade of economic and employment growth is a record low
unemployment rate and a record high labour force participation rate. Employment and
wages growth have not, however, been evenly distributed across either demographic
or geographic groups. As discussed above, the state of Queensland experienced
employment growth of nearly 6 per cent in 2006, around twice the national average,
while Tasmania experienced a 1.8 per cent reduction in the number of people
employed. Similarly, while some regions are now recording zero unemployment,
others, including some major metropolitan centres, continue to experience double
digit unemployment rates. Finally, the incomes of those in employment rose unevenly
in 2006. While those employed in the relatively highly paid sectors of mining and
construction experienced strong wages growth, employees in the relatively poorly
paid industries of retail and hospitality received some of the lowest average wage
increases in 2006.
While the labour market is performing well in terms of summary indicators such as
the unemployment rate and the LFPR the benefits of a strong labour market are not
being distributed evenly. It is clear that steady economic growth has not solved the
problems of youth unemployment, regional unemployment or low wages in some
sectors. It is, therefore, unlikely, that the continuation of current policies will solve
such problems in the future. Now that the goal of low unemployment has been
achieved perhaps the most important problem for policy makers is no longer the
choice of policy instrument, but the choice of policy targets.
The disparities emerging in the labour market with respect to wages and
unemployment are of particular relevance in the context of the implementation of
WorkChoices legislation. Those in low paid sectors, where labour is relatively
plentiful and turnover costs are low, are especially vulnerable to price competition.
WorkChoices has effectively lowered transaction costs for employers seeking to
reduce labour costs by enhancing managerial prerogative to impose conditions of
employment and establishing a near ‘employment-at-will’ environment. Ironically,
while some employers may not wish to adopt the ‘low road’ employment relations
options permitted under WorkChoices, they may have no choice where one or more
competitors choose this path. The tight labour markets currently being experienced in
some industries such as mining will prevent these options from being exercised for
the time being, meaning that sharper differences in wages and employment outcomes
are likely to be experienced by workers within the Australian labour market for some
time to come.
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i

It is worth noting that Des Moore, an advocate for greater labour market deregulation has stated in
relation to the Work Choices legislation that "On the one hand it (WorkChoices) purports to allow
Australia's employers and employees the freedom and the choice to sit down and work out the
arrangements that best suit them, but only the other hand, continues to severely constrain that freedom"
Moore (2006).
ii
The federal industrial inspectorate enlarged under Work Choices.
iii
The Employment Advocate took a question on notice (W325_07) as to how many AWAs are
sampled but at the time of publication, the answer had not yet been provided.
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